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REPLY ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT I 
Respondents acknowledge the difference in the approach 
to damages arrived at by the trial court in comparing the 
"Memorandum Decision" with the formal "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law", but claim, among other things, that 
1 
Appellants can't demonstrate that the Judgment would have 
differed had the formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law been timely filed (Resp. Brief, page 7). 
The issue is not the amount of the Judgment that the 
Court entered, but the basis both in law and fact upon which 
it is predicated. For example, did the trial court find that 
$6,325.00 was expended by the landlord for repairs plus 
general improvements as its Memorandum Decision suggests 
(Record page 51)? If so, we contend that the trial court erred 
in allowing that portion of this amount that was expended for 
general improvements inasmuch as the leased premises in this 
case was only a "shell" to begin with and these general expenses 
amount to capital improvements that the landlord would have made 
in spite of the lease or any breach thereof by the tenant. 
Or did the Court find that the entire $6,325.00 was 
spent for repairs occasion by the tenants lease requirements 
or their abuse of the leased property? This is apparently 
what the Court recites in its formal Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law (Record, page 66). If so, we contend that the 
evidence doesn't factually support these findings. There is no 
evidence in the Record as to the expense of improvements incurred 
by the Respondents in providing for the special needs of the 
Appellants which were lost by the breach (ie., "special six-
foot interior walls", etc.). The only evidence with regard to 
damage to the leased premises is that of the carpet and scuff 
marks on the walls (Transcript, pages 78-79). 
2 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT II. 
The case of Reid v. Mutual of Omaha, Insurance, 110 
Utah Advance Reports, page 12, cited in Respondents Brief, in 
some respects would appear to make the arguments in Appellants 
original Brief moot. This case was filed June 12, 1989, some 
90 days after Notice of Appeal was filed. Appellants had no 
knowledge of the case at the time their original Brief was 
prepared and filed. In Reid, the Supreme Court determined that 
when a commercial lease is breached by the tenant, a landlord 
must take active steps to mitigate his damages. These steps must 
be "commercially reasonable" and include costs reasonably incurred 
in readying the property for reletting or attempting to relet 
the premises. The Court went on to say that in a given case, such 
costs may include, not only expenses incurred in seeking new 
tenants, but also costs of repairs or alterations of the premises 
reasonably necessary to successfully relet them (Id. at page 17). 
The Reid case appears to formulate the law in Utah with regard to 
claims of lost rent by requiring a landlord to actively repair 
and alter the premises in an effort to relet them. With regard 
to damages as it pertains to actual lost rent, the Supreme Court 
in Reid mandates that the trial court retain jurisdiction to 
adjust for future losses, occasioned by the interruption of 
rentals (Id. at page 18). 
Consistant with the Court's analysis in Reid that the 
trial court retain jurisdiction to adjust for future losses of 
rent to the landlord, is the proposition that credit should also 
3 
be given the tenant for any actual increase in rental income 
to the landlord over the lifetime of the breached lease as a 
result of reletting. In other words, if the breaching tenant 
is to be held accountable for repairs, alterations and other 
improvements required to successfully relet the premises, he 
should have increased rentals credited against those costs. 
If the Court of Appeals follows the reasoning in Reid, it could 
conclude that the arguments made by Appellants are rendered moot 
by its decision. It could reason that it matters not what label 
the trial court placed upon the expenses incurred by Respondents, 
and that those expenses, be they for necessary repair, general 
capital improvements or special improvements are recoverable if 
they were commercially reasonable and necessary in successfully 
reletting the premises. On this basis, the Judgment of the trial 
court concerning that portion of its damage award would be 
sustained. 
Consistant with Reid, however, is this Court's obligation 
to reduce the Judgment of the trial court by that amount of 
money that the trial court determined that the Respondent gained 
in increased rentals over the life of the lease by his successful 
reletting to the new tenant. The trial court found that amount 
to be $5,040.00 (Record, page 51). 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT III. 
The Respondents, citing Reid, request the Court of Appeals 
increase the Judgment to the full amount of $12,649.32 for repair 
and alteration of the leased premises. 
4 
Point III is without merit as Respondents have not 
cross-appealed. Rule 4(d) of The Rules of The Utah Court of 
Appeals require any Cross-Appeal to be filed within 14 days 
after the date on which the first Notice of Appeal was filed 
or within 30 days from final Judgment whichever period last 
expires. This Rule is identical to Rule 4(d) of The Rules of 
The Utah Supreme Court. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 
4(d) indicates that this paragraph adopts the time period and 
concept of cross-appeal in Rule 4(d)(3) FRAP. 
It is basic law that while a Respondent who has not 
cross-appealed may argue in the Appellate Court in support of 
the decision appealed from, he may not seek review to obtain a 
decision more favorable to him than that appealed from by the 
other party. 5 Am Jur 2d 152 (Appeal & Error i707) . Jaffke v. 
* — — — - — — 
Dunham, 352 US 280, 1 L ed 2d 314, 77 Supreme Court 307. 
Without notice of cross-appeal being filed or given, 
the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to consider Respondent's 
request that the Judgment be increased. Griffen v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad Company, 31 U 296, 87 P 1091 (1906); Yost v. State, 640 
P. 2d 1044 (Utah 1981); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
1982); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nelson 
v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983). In summary, Respondents 
may cite Reid v. Mutual of Omaha to support the Judgment but not 
to increase it. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha seems to govern the issue of 
damages in this case. Reid was filed after Appellants had 
filed their Notice of Appeal and was unknown to them until 
Respondents Brief was filed. Until Reid/ the law of damages 
in Utah was uncertain in cases of this type. The trial court 
used a formula for fixing damages unsatisfactory to Appellants 
and they appealed. The formula was apparently satisfactory 
to Respondents as they filed no cross-appeal. The Court of 
Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain Respondents request 
to increase the Judgment. It does have jurisdiction to uphold 
it or modify it. The reasoning in Reid dictates that credit 
against the Judgment be given Appellants in the sum of $5,040., 
being the amount of increased rent over the life of the breached 
lease. The Judgment of the trial court should be reduced 
accordingly and the case remanded for entry of the reduced 
Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this X7^ day of September, 1989. 
/MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
8 
2. 
What they boil down to is, when a tenant breaches, the owner has 
a duty to take steps to mitigate damages and lease to another 
tenant as soon as is reasonably possible. In order to do that, 
the owner usually must remodel and prepare the premises to the 
desire of the new tenant. He is entitled to be reimbursed for 
expenses incurred to the extent that they are expenses of 
mitigation and not capital improvements which are likely to be 
beneficial beyond the term of the new tenant. 
The fix-up expenses testified to by defendant (the owner) and 
his witness totaled $12,649.32. There was no testimony 
specifying whether a particular expense was mitigation or 
capital improvement. From an analysis of them, as to amount and 
kind, the Court concludes that approximately 50% of them were 
for the particular tenant, and the other half usable for any 
tenant. Applying that to the testimony, defendant is entitled 
to reimbursement of $6,325 (rounded). 
Additionally, defendant is entitled to rent for part of March, 
$250, for April, $790, and for one week in May, $184, a total of 
$1224. Plaintiff is entitled to a credit of $500 in prepaid 
rent and that leaves net rent due defendant in the amount of 
$724. Evidence of attorney fees for defendant was in the sum of 
$1,435, an amount the Court finds to be reasonable in light of 
the subject matter and nature of the litigation, and the 
experience of counsel on both sides. When those sums are 
totaled they reach $8,484. It is pertinent to note also that 
defendant will receive increased rent from the new tenant in the 
24 months remaining on plaintiffs' term amounting to $5,040. 
The Court grants judgment for $8,484 plus court costs to 
defendant on his counter claim, and since a set-off has already 
been accorded plaintiffs, finds in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiffs on plaintiffs' comp 
;e 2 
an Warren 
idings of Fact 
nclusions of Law 
2. That the parties entered into a lease agreement on 
ril 9, 1986 at $750,00 per month to lease units 2 and 3 at 12 
uth Main, Layton Utah for the 1st year and $790.00 per month 
r years 2 and 3 of the lease. 
3. That Plaintiff tenants breached said lease agreement 
i March of 1987, with Defendants, by vacating the premises. 
4. That Defendants spent $12,649.32 to fix up the real 
roperty previously leased by Plaintiff's. 
5. That Plaintiffs failed to pay rent in March of 
250.00, April $790.00 and one week in May for $184.00. 
6. That Plaintiff's had prepaid $500.00 in rent. 
7. That the lease agreement specified Defendants could 
ecover attorney's fees and Court costs. 
8. That Defendants did in fact hire an attorney in the 
ibove matter. 
9. That 50% of Defendants' improvements were for general 
improvement of the premises or another tenant and not expended 
as a result of the lease between the parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the above 
entitled action. 
2. Defendant is entitled to and is hereby awarded a 
judgment of $8,489.00 computed as follows: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
did he have any conversation with Mr. Hooker about that. 
Overruled. He may ask. 
THE WITNESS: Ask the question again'. 
Q (By ttr. Olmstead) Did you -- did you advise 
Stan that, notwithstanding the fact that he had a new tenant 
in line, Mr. Hooker was still responsible? 
A No, I didn't advise Stan at all. 
Q One way or the other? 
A No. 
Q Now this -- you mentioned the damage to 
the carpet and the walls and let's go to the walls. There 
was some nail holes in the walls when they moved out? 
A Yes. 
Q There was an area behind where his desk was 
where the back of his chair had rubbed on the wall and 
creased the wall and stained it or whatever, and that, in 
your opinion, would require replacing a section of sheet-
rock? 
A Yes, or patching. I am sure that it could 
be patched. 
Q 
patch that? 
A 
Q 
Do you have any idea what it would cost to 
I don't. 
Would the nail could the nail holes be 
fixed with a little bit of spackle here and there? 
78 
A Yeah, but then you would have to paint 
agai n. 
Q Repaint. What were the walls, were they 
painted wal1s ---
A Yes. 
Q that were provided for Mr. Hooker and 
Mrs. Thomas? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And what about -- what did you do to the 
walls after -- or what was done with the walls when U.S. 
Title moved in? 
A The exterior walls, of course, were redone, 
patched and painted. The interior walls were all taken 
out. Six-foot walls were not what they wanted so they all 
had to come out, with the exception of the bathroom. 
Q Well, if I understand this, part of the 
work that was done for their needs were these interior walls 
to make individual offices or cubicles? 
A Yes. 
Q Were they solid walls to the ceiling or 
were they just kind of cubicles? 
A Just six-foot high. 
Q Six-foot high. And those had to come out 
for U.S. Title? 
A Yes. 
79 
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r ^This opinion is subject to revision before V 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. «*. ' / 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: *•}'•;&*« Jf^l*]'"*** 
Mutual of Omaha ("Mutual") appeals from 
a judgment in a nonjury trial finding it liable 
to Mervin and Ethna Reid ("the Reids") for 
breach of a lease»for office space.. Mutual 
contends that the trial court erred in rejecting 
its claim that the • Reids had constructively 
evicted Mutual and,that it also erred in calc-
ulating the damages due the Reids. We affirm 
the, judgments of liability .for breach of the 
lease but reverse in partr on the{ determination 
of damages. . l\ * , * ? . ; \ v » " 
In September of 1980, Mutual, as tenant, 
and the Reids, as landlord, entered a five-
year lease agreement for office space at a 
monthly rate of $1,100. The lease term was to 
end in October of 1985. Mutual took posses-
sion of the premises, which it used to conduct 
an insurance sales business. Soon afterward, 
another tenant moved into adjoining space in 
the building. The other tenant, Intermountain 
Marketing ("Intermountain"), operated a door-
to-door cookware sales business and used its 
office space to train its large sales force. 
Mutual made numerous complaints to the 
Reids that Intermountain*s personnel were 
excessively noisy, occupied all of MutuaPs 
parking spaces, and otherwise interfered with 
Mutuai's business. Mutual felt that the Reids 
did not respond adequately to the frequent 
complaints and, in February of 1982, gave 
notice and vacated the premises. In April of 
1982, the Reids filed suit, claiming that 
Mutual had breached the lease and was liable 
for the monthly rental for the three and a half 
UTAH 
Mutual counterclaimed, contending that it had 
been * constructively ''evicted by the Reids* 
failure to control the activities of Intermoun-
tain/* While the litigation was proceeding, the 
Reids "remodeled the premises at issue and 
leased them to Intermountain for the remai-
nder of the five-year term at a rate compar-
able v to < what Mutual had been ' paying. 
However, in November of 1982, Intermoun-
tain vacated and declared bankruptcy} from 
that point through the date of -trial, the pre-
mises were left vacant.' •"' ' • A ' '' * 
* A bench trial was held in July of 1983. 
After ' hearing extensive r evidence, the court 
found against Mutual on its counterclaim for 
constructive eviction, concluding that the noisy 
conditions were not sufficiently disruptive to 
amount to a constructive eviction.'The court 
found that Mutual had breached the lease 
agreement and awarded the' Reids damages 
under the v terms of the agreement. f These 
consisted of the total of the unpaid rents, 
including both those that had accrued through 
the date of trial and those that would accrue 
from the date of trial through the end of the 
lease term in 1985, less rents actually received 
from Intermountain during the time it occu-
pied the Mutual premises,' plus the costs of 
reletting and attorney fees.1 
" Before this Court, Mutual attacks the trial 
court's failure to find for it on the construc-
tive eviction counterclaim. In the event that 
challenge fails, Mutual contends that the trial 
court erred in calculating the damages due 
from it to the Reids. 
Mutual's attack on the trial court's const-
ructive eviction ruling has two prongs. First, it 
contends that the trial court's findings of fact 
regarding the disruptiveness of Intermoun-
tain's behavior are inadequate to support its 
legal conclusion because they lack the neces-
sary specificity. Second, Mutual claims that 
the trial court's findings and its resulting 
conclusion that a constructive eviction had not 
occurred lack evidentiary support. 
We first address the challenge to the speci-
ficity of the findings of fact. Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the 
judge in a bench trial to "find the facts spec-
ially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon." Utah R. Civ, P. 52(a). The failure 
to enter adequate findings of fact on material 
issues may be reversible error. See, e.g., Acton 
v. J.B. Deliran, Corp., 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987). The findings must be articulated 
with sufficient detail so that the basis of the-
ultimate conclusion can be understood. See, 
e.g., id. at 999; Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 
426 (Utah 1986); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336,1338-39 (Utah 1979). 
Here, although the Findings of fact entered 
by the trial court are not a model of clarity, 
we conclude that they are adequate. The fin-
dings satisfactorily express the trial court's 
CE REPORTS 
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determination as to the nature of the activities 
carried on by Intermountain in' the space 
adjacent to Mutual's and its determination 
that the noise and other annoyances were not 
so egregious as to render the premises unsuit-
able for their intended use, as is required for a 
claim of constructive eviction. See, e.g., Brug-
get v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648» (Utah 
1982); see generallyA Backman, Landlord-
Tenant Law: A Perspective on < Reform in 
Utah, 1981 Utah U Rev. 727, 740 [hereinafter 
Backman, 1981 Utah L. Rev.]; 2 R. Powell, The 
Law of Real Property, Landlord and 
Tenant Estates, 1232 (1988). The findings are 
also sufficiently detailed to reveal the trial 
court's reasoning processes. Therefore, the 
findings meet the requirements of rule 52(a). , 
We next address Mutual's claim. that the 
findings and the resulting conclusion that there 
was no constructive eviction are not adequa-
tely supported by the evidence.. To mount a 
successful challenge to the correctness of a 
trial court's findings of fact, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence supporting 
the finding and then demonstrate that i the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
findings even in viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below. In re Estate of 
Bartell, 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 28, 
1989) (mem. op.); State v. Mitchell, 103 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 13 (March 2, 1989); Scharfv. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The 
legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined 
by the standard set out in civil rule 52(a), 
which provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). - This 
"clearly erroneous" standard applies whether 
the case is characterized as one in equity or 
one in law. See Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 
548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Ashton 
v. Ashton, > 733 P.2d • 147, 150 and n.l 
(Utah 1987). A finding attacked as lacking 
adequate evidentiary support is deemed 
"clearly erroneous" only if we conclude that 
the finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence. In re Estate of Bartell, State v. Mit-
chell, see Western Kane County Special 
Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 
P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987); Stare v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191,192-93 (Utah 1987). 
-> Here, the * evidence * provides adequate 
support for the findings. We certainly cannot 
say that they are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, especially when we give "due 
regard" to the trial court's opportunity to 
assess the credibility of the numerous witnesses 
called by each party. Because the court's 
conclusion of law on the constructive eviction 
issue is fully supported by these findings, 
Mutual's arguments on this issue are rejected, 
and we affirm the determination that Mutual 
a Insurance Company _ 
v. Rep 12 l £ 
breached the lease agreement by vacating the 
premises and failing to pay rent after February 
of 1982. 
Mutual next argues that even if the trial 
court properly rejected its constructive eviction 
claim and found it to have breached the lease, 
the Reids were entitled only to damages for 
nonpayment of rents measured by those rents 
that came due between the date of Mutual's 
last payment and the date of the reletting to 
Intermountain. Mutual contends that the trial 
court erred when it included in the measure of 
damages the unpaid rents that accrued after 
this reletting. 
In support of this argument, Mutual relies 
upon the common law doctrine of "surrender 
and acceptance." Under that doctrine, when a 
tenant surrenders the premises to a landlord 
before a lease term expires and the' landlord 
accepts that surrender, the tenant is no longer 
in privity of estate with the landlord and the-
refore has no obligation to pay any rents 
accruing after the date of the acceptance. See, 
e.g., Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 
1330 (Utah 1977); Willis v. Kronendonk, 58 
Utah 592, 597-98, 200 P, 1025, 1027-28 
(1921). See generally Backman, 1981 Utah L. 
Rev. at 737-39; 49 Am. Jur/ 2d Landlord 
and Tenant §§619-25 (1970);.^ American 
Law of Property §3.99 (Casner' 1952); Rest-
atement (Second) of Property, §12.1 (1977). 
Phrased in contract law parlance, the lease is 
treated as having been rescinded or terminated 
by mutual agreement.2 Sec Humbach, The 
Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mit-
igation, Habitability, and *• Dependence of 
Covenants, 60 Wash.*U.L.Q. 1213, 1237-41 
(1983). Mutual contends that this common law 
doctrine was applicable under the terms of the 
lease agreement. It then argues that the Reids' 
actions in remodeling the premises and relet-
ting them to Intermountain amounted to an 
acceptance of surrender that relieved Mutual 
of its obligation to pay further rents. , < * *? 
At common law,, the critical issue in appl-
ying the doctrine of surrender and acceptance 
is determining whether the landlord intended 
to accept the surrender. This intention may be 
express or implied. See Frisco Joe's, 558 P.2d 
at 1330; Mariani Air Prods. Co. v. Gill's Tire 
Mkt., 29 Utah 2d 291, 293, 508 P.2d 808, 810 
(1973); Belanger v.< Rice, 2 Utah 2d 250, 272 
P.2d 173 (1954) 2 R. Powell, The Law of Real 
Property, 124911) (1988). The lease agreement 
between the Reids and Mutual deals specific-
ally with the question'of how the functional 
equivalent of an intent to accept a surrender, 
denominated an "election by Landlord to 
terminate this Lease," would be manifested. 
Paragraph 19 of the lease agreement states in 
part:$ 
If Tenant shall make default in 
the payment of the rent reserved ... 
or if the leased premises ... shall be 
UTAH ADVANCE 
abandoned ror vacated*»i..»uthen 
Landlord, in addition«to any other 
rights or remedies it may have, shall 
have the immediate right * of re-
entry Landlord may elect to re-
enter, as herein provided, or Lan-
dlord may take possession pursuant 
to this Lease and relet said premises 
..".I*' No such ' re-entry ' or' taking 
possession of the premises by Lan* 
dlord shall be construed as an ele-
ction by Landlord to terminate this 
Lease unless the termination thereof 
be decreed by a court of competent 
jurisdiction or stated specifically by 
the Landlord in writing* addressed 
to Tenant/* Notwithstanding any 
such reletting without termination, 
Landlord may • at any time therea-
fter elect to terminate this Lease for 
such previous breach. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The lease thus provided for two means of 
proving an election by the landlord to termi-
nate: a written notice from the landlord or a 
decree by a court. It is undisputed that the 
Reids did not elect to terminate the lease (or in 
common law terminology, accept fne surre-
nder) by means'of a writing addressed to 
Mutual. But Mutual argues that the language 
referring to a termination of the lease "decreed 
by a court" should be read to mean that a 
termination has occurred if a court, applying 
the common law rules for determining the 
landlord's intentions from its actions, concl-
udes that there has been an acceptance of a 
surrender. Mutual then argues that the trial 
court erred when it failed to decree that the 
Reids* conduct constituted an, acceptance of 
surrender that terminated the lease. 
We need not decide whether the language of 
the lease effectively incorporated the common 
law surrender and acceptance • doctrine, - as 
Mutual argues, nor need we address the extent 
to which the doctrine should be given contin-
uing vitality in modern landlord-tenant rel-
ationships. For even if that doctrine did apply, 
its requirements are not satisfied here. 
. At common law, a tenant raising the affir-
mative defense of surrender and acceptance 
has the burden of proving the landlord's 
intent to accept the surrender. See Mariani Air 
Prods. Co., 29 Utah 2d at 293, 508 P.2d at 
810; John C. Cutler Ass'n v. Dejay Stores, 
Inc., 3 Utah 2d 107, 110, 279 P.2d 700, 702 
(1955). And the determination of the land-
lord's * intention is a question of fact. See 
Mariani Air Prods., 29 Utah at 293, 508 P.2d 
at 810. Here, then, when the trial court found 
that the Reids' actions amounted to a reentry 
and "reletting without termination," it effect-
ively determined that Mutual had not met its 
burden of proof1 on the factual question of 
intent. Therefore, on appeal Mutual has the 
burden of marshalling the supporting evidence 
and then demonstrating that the trial court's 
finding on this point lacks adequate record 
support under the r "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard. In re Estate of Bartell; State v. Mitchell; 
Scharff100 P.2d at 1070. We conclude that 
Mutual has not met that burden. Our previous 
cases • have held that conduct such as the 
Reids'—reentering, remodeling, and relet-
ting the premises-isr relevant to, but not 
conclusive evidence of, an intent to accept the 
surrendered premises and terminate the lease.3 
See John C. Cutler Ass'n v. DeJay Stores, 
Inc., 3 Utah 2d at 111-12, 279 P.2d at 702-
03. We affirm the trial court's finding that the 
Reids'' conduct was a reletting witliout termi-
nation. 
Mutual next contends that even if it was 
liable for some rents accruing after the prem-
ises had been relet, the trial court erred in 
fixing the amount. This argument has several 
subparts, each of which attacks different parts 
of the damage award. To put Mutual's cont-
entions in context, a brief review of the 
court's damage award is appropriate. 
Shortly after Mutual's vacation of the pre-
mises, the Reids reached an agreement with 
Intermountain to take over the vacated space. 
The premises were remodeled to meet Inter-
mountain's needs, and Intermountain took 
possession under an agreement to remain in 
possession through the end of Mutual's full 
term in October of 1985 at the same $1,100 
per month that Mutual had agreed to pay. 
However, Intermountain paid rent only until 
November of 1982, when it defaulted and 
vacated all of its rented space. The trial court 
held that under the terms of the lease, Mutual 
was liable for all rents accruing from the date 
of its breach until the date of trial,4 less any 
amounts actually received from Intermountain 
plus the costs of remodeling to meet Interm-
ountain's specifications, as well as attorney 
fees and court costs. The trial court also 
addressed liability for rents accruing after the 
date of the trial. It awarded the Reids an 
amount equal to the total of all rents that 
would have come due under the terms of the 
lease from the trial date through the end of 
the original lease term in October of 1985, 
some twenty-four months later less any 
amounts the Reids might realize from future 
reletting of the premises for any part of the 
original term.5 
Mutual first contends that the trial court 
erred in requiring it to pay the Reids an 
amount that represents the rents that Interm-
ountain had agreed to pay but did not actually 
pay for the space vacated by Mutual. Second, 
Mutual claims that the court erred by inclu-
ding in the damage measure future rents that 
would accrue from the date of trial through 
the end of the term without expressly requiring 
the Reids to mitigate their post-trial damages 
by taking reasonable steps to find other 
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tenants to occupy the premises for the remai-
nder of the term. 
With respect to Mutual's first claim, it 
-concedes that the trial court properly awarded 
damages for rents accruing between the time it 
vacated and the time the premises were relet to 
Intermountain. However, Mutual argues that 
after the premises had been relet, paragraph 
19 of the lease agreement limited the Reids' 
damages to the difference between the rent 
reserved for the months remaining under the 
Mutual-Reid lease and the rent the new 
tenant agreed to pay, rather than the amount ac* 
tually paid by the new tenant. 
This argument is utterly without merit. 
Paragraph 19 states in part: 
Landlord may elect to re-enter as 
herein provided, or Landlord may 
take possession pursuant to this 
Lease artd relet said premises or any 
part thereof for such term or terms 
... and at such rental or rentals and 
upon such other terms and condit-
ions as Landlord in the exercise of 
Landlord's sole discretion may 
deem advisable with the right to 
make alterations and repairs to said 
premises. Upon each such reletting, 
Tenant shall be immediately liable, 
for and shall pay to Landlord, in 
addition to any indebtedness due 
hereunder, the costs and expenses 
of such reletting including adverti-
sing costs, brokerage fees, any 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
and the cost of such alterations and 
repairs incurred by Landlord, and 
the amount, if any, by which the 
rent reserved in this Lease for the 
period of such reletting (up to but 
not beyond the term of this Lease) 
exceeds the amount agreed to be 
paid as rent for the premises for 
said period by such reletting. / / 
Tenant has been credited with any 
rent to be received by such reletting 
and such rents shall not be prom-
ptly paid to Landlord by the new 
Tenant, such deficiency shall be 
calculated and paid monthly by 
Tenant. 
(Emphasis added.) The emphasized language 
clearly provides that Mutual was to be respo-
nsible for any amounts not actually paid by 
the new tenant. In effect, Mutual had agreed 
to serve as an insurer against the default of 
the new tenant, and the trial court merely 
enforced that agreement as written 
Mutual's second challenge relates to that 
portion of the award dealing with rents that 
were to accrue between the date of trial and 
the end of the original lease term. Mutual 
contends that the judgment entered fails to 
ensure that the Reids would mitigate their 
damages by reletting the premises. 
We are thus faced with the question of 
whether Utah law imposes a duty upon land-
lords to mitigate their damages by reletting 
premises after a tenant has wrongfully vacated 
and defaulted on the covenant to pay rent. 
There is no controlling statute,7 and our res-
earch has revealed no case in which we have 
directly addressed the question. See Survey of 
Utah Law, 1965 Utah L.t Rev. 770, 771. 
However, the concept of landlords mitigating 
their damages by reletting has been mentioned 
in several cases where the doctrine of surre-
nder and acceptance was at issue.1 In those 
cases, the Court spoke favorably of, at a 
minimum, allowing landlords to mitigate by 
reletting without the risk that such mitigation 
efforts would be treated as an acceptance of 
surrender. See, e.g., Meyer v. Evans, 16 Utah 
2d 56, 57, 395 P.2d 726, 727 (1964); John C. 
Cutler Ass'n, 3 Utah 2d at 111, 279 P.2d at 
702; Belanger v. Rice, 2 Utah 2d at 252, 272 
P.2datl74. 
In looking to the law of other jurisdictions, 
we find a split of authority on the question. In 
states following what has been described as the 
traditional rule, landlords are not required to 
mitigate by reletting. See Restatement (Second) 
of Property §12.1(3) (1977); 49 Am. Jur. 2d 
Landlord and Tenant §621 (1970). A number 
of states have recently reconsidered the tradi-
tional view and, following what has been 
termed a trend rule, have imposed by statute 
or judicial decision some obligation to relet. 
See, e.g., Schneiker'v. Gordon, 732 P.2d 603 
(Colo. 1987); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446,, 
378 A.2d 767 (1977). See generally 2 R. 
Powell,, The Law of Real Property, 1249[2] 
(1988); Note, Illinois Landlords' New Statu-
tory Duty to Mitigate Damages: 111. Rev. Stat. 
Ch. 110, §9-213.1, 34 DePaul L. Rev. 1033 
(1985) [hereinafter Illinois Landlords' Duty, 
34 DePaul L. Rev.]; I American Law of Pro-
perty §3.99 (Casner 1952); 52 C.J.S. Land-
lord and Tenant §498 (1968); Backman, 1981 
Utah L. Rev., at 728-34; Annotation, Lan-
dlord's Duty, on Tenant's Failure to Occupy, 
or Abandonment of Premises, to Mitigate 
Damages by Accepting or Procuring Another 
Tenant, 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968) [hereinafter 
Annotation, 21 A.L.R. 3d]. These two com; 
peting rules reflect an evolution in the under-
lying doctrinal approach that has begun to 
have an impact on many issues of landlord-
tenant law. As commentators have noted, the 
traditional rule imposing no duty to mitigate 
has its roots in ancient property law concepts 
under which leaseholds are considered estates 
in land. The trend rule reflects the more 
modern view that leases are essentially com-
mercial transactions, contractual in nature. See 
Kwall, Retained Jurisdiction <• in Damage 
Actions Based on Anticipatory Breach: A 
Missing Link in Landlord - Tenant Law, 37 
Case • W. Res. L> Rev. 273, 274 (1986) 
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*< A number of justifications have been adv-
anced in support of the traditional rule. One is 
that forcing a landlord to mitigate is unfair 
when ' the" conduct "'constituting * mitigation 
might be viewed as evidence of an acceptance 
of a surrender, a result not actually in accor-
dance with the landlord's intentions. Another 
justification is equitable in nature: it is unfair 
to allow the breaching'tenant to force'on the 
innocent landlord an affirmative duty to seek 
out new tenants and perhaps let the premises 
to tenants "not entirely suitable in the land-
lord's subjective view. A final ground offered 
for retaining the traditional rule is simply that 
it is of long standing and in conformance with 
underlying property law notions. See generally 
21 A>L.R.3d at 548-49. 
The first of these justifications for the tra-
ditional rule can be easily obviated. As already 
noted, there is no reason to permit mitigating 
conduct to be used as indicia of an intent to 
accept a surrender* See supra note 3. As for 
the second, there is some * validity-to the 
concern that the breaching party should not be 
able to force its landlord to seek other tenants 
on ' pain ' of losing? bargained-for rents.1 
However, we think this point is outweighed by 
the policy arguments in favor of the modern 
rule, and we think any unfairness to the lan-
dlord can ~ largely be eliminated by careful 
application * of ' a rule « requiring reasonable 
mitigation efforts only. 
As for the final justification offered for the 
traditional rule, it is true that that rule reflects 
ancient property law concepts; however, those 
concepts! themselves are no longer consonant 
with mostJ modern landlord-tenant relation-
ships.* First, the ancient law of leaseholds was 
developed in the ,context of leases of agricult-
ural land. Those leases generally ran from 
growing season to growing season. If a tenant 
vacated after planting time had passed, it was 
unrealistic to expect the landlord to find a new 
tenant interested in leasing land that was ess-
entially useless for the remainder of the term. 
Cf. Utah 'Code 'Ann. §78-36-4 (1987) 
(statute allows agricultural land tenant to hold 
over for another year when landlord fails to 
object within 60 days to tenant's remaining in 
possession following lease term expiration). 
Therefore, a rule requiring mitigation by rel-
etting would have been highly artificial in the 
practical context of most landlord-tenant 
relationships.' But today, agricultural leases 
constitute only*a minor part of the modern 
leasing market. Growing seasons are irrelevant 
to ' the ' leasing of residential premises and 
commercial buildings. Second, the traditional 
rule also stems from the ancient concept that a 
leasehold is*a complete conveyance of a real 
property interest such that the tenant becomes, 
for a defined term of years, the owner of the 
property and the landlord simply has no 
present 'ownership interest in the property 
inconsistent witn tnis concept or a lease to 
impose upon the landlord, who has no interest 
in the property during the lease term, the 
obligation to relet the property for the rema-
inder of that term. See Welcome v. Hess, 90 
Cal. 507, •!_; 27 P. 369, 371 (1891); Gruman 
v. Investors Diversified Servs.l Inc., 247 Minn. 
5 0 2 / 5 0 6 - 0 7 / 7 8 N.W.2d 377, 380 (1956). 
Today,'leases are generally viewed as comm-
ercial ' transactions in which the landlord 
retains' the 'estate but permits its use by 
another on specified conditions; leases are 
seldom seen as complete conveyances of the 
underlying property for a specified term. Our 
unlawful detainer statutes sub silentio recog-
nize this changed view of a landlord's retained 
interest in the property when they authorize a 
landlord to evict a breaching tenant and 
reenter and relet the premises in very short 
order. See Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-8.5,-
12,-12.6(1987). 
In sum, the principal justifications given to 
support the traditional rule are to a large 
extent anachronistic. In contrast, we find 
persuasive the reasons advanced in support of 
the trend rule requiring the landlord to take 
steps to mitigate its losses. For example, the 
economies of both the state and the nation 
benefit from a rule that encourages the relet-
ting of premises, which returns them to pro-
ductive use, rather than permitting a landlord 
to let them sit idle while it seeks rents from 
the breaching tenant. See Schneiker v. Gordon, 
732 P.2d at 610; Illinois Landlords' Duty, 34 
DePaul L. Rev. at 1033, 1040, 1064; and 
Beckman, Duty of Commercial Landlords to 
Mitigate: Some Thoughts on Darpar Associ-
ates, 55 Conn. B.J. 339, 345 (1981). 
In addition, the trend rule is more in 
keeping with the current policy disfavoring 
contractual penalties. Damages recoverable 
under a liquidated damages provision in a 
contract will generally be limited to an amount 
that represents a reasonable estimation, made 
at the time the contract was drafted, of what 
would be necessary to compensate the nonbr-
eaching party for losses caused by the breach. 
This policy is based on the view that any liq-
uidated damages provision not so limited 
results in the imposition of a penalty on the 
breaching party that is not permitted. See 
Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559, 561, 563 
(Utah 1985); Water Implement, Inc. v. Focht, 
107 Wash. 2d 553, 558-59, 730 P.2d 1340, 
1343-44 (1987). Similarly, allowing a land-
lord to leave property idle when it could be 
profitably leased and force an absent tenant to 
pay rent for that idled property permits the 
landlord to recover more damages than it may 
reasonably require to be compensated for the 
tenant's breach. This is analogous to imposing 
a disfavored penalty upon the tenant. 
Finally, the trend rule is more in line with 
the policy favoring mitigation that we have 
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adopted in other areas of the law. For 
example, mitigation is generally required when 
damages are sought in tort cases, as well as in 
contract cases.
 xSee, »e.g., Angelos v., First 
Interstate Bank,x61l P.2d at 777; Jankele v. 
Texas Co., 88 Utah 325, 332-33, 54 P.2d 
425, 428 (1936); see also Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §918(1) (1979). 
In light of these considerations, we conclude 
that a mitigation requirement is generally 
appropriate in the context of modern landlord-
tenant transactions, and we join those courts 
now following the trend rule described above. 
We hold that a landlord who seeks to hold a 
breaching tenant liable for unpaid rents has an 
obligation to take, commercially reasonable 
steps to mitigate its losses, which ordinarily 
means that the landlord must seek to relet the 
premises. 
Certain aspects of our holding require some 
elaboration. Because a landlord may occasio-
nally bring an action for unpaid rents and 
other , amounts due • before the lease term 
expires, as happened here, it is appropriate 
that we spell out how the mitigation obligation 
is to be handled, both as to past due and 
future accruing rents. If the trial of the land-
lord's action occurs after the end of the lease 
term and the tenant is found to have breached 
the lease agreement, the landlord then has the 
burden of proving , both 1 the- amount of 
damages and the fact that it took appropriate 
mitigation efforts. Assuming the landlord 
carries this burden, a judgment and damage 
award on the whole cause arising out of the 
breach can then be rendered. However,
 4if the 
trial occurs before the end of the lease term, a 
judgment cannot be entered for rents that 
have not yet accrued; any damage award must 
be limited to taking account only of rents that 
h*ve accrued as of the trial date. To recover 
for later accruing rents, the landlord. must 
bring a supplemental proceeding or proceed-
ings in which it can prove that additional rents 
have accrued and that reasonable efforts to 
mitigate those losses have been taken. 
Another point warranting clarification is the 
affirmative nature of the mitigation obliga-
tion. Some courts imposing a mitigation req-
uirement do not require landlords to show 
active efforts to, relet; instead, the
 t landlord 
can carry its
 T proof-of-mitigation ( burden 
simply by showing that it was passively rece-
ptive to opportunities to relet the premises. See 
Reget v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 96 111. 
App. 2d 278, 281, 238 N.E.2d 418, 419 (1968). 
We conclude that this minimal showing does 
not serve the policies that underlie, the adop-
tion of a mitigation requirement. We prefer to 
follow those courts that have required that the 
landlord take positive steps reasonably calcu-
lated to effect a reletting of the premises. See 
Butler Products Co* v. Roush, 153 Ariz. 500, 
503, 738 P.2d 775, 778 (1987); Schneiker v, 
GordQn, 732 P.2d at 611; Olsen v. Country 
Club Sports,, Inc.', 110 Idaho 789,^794-95, 
718 P.2d 1227, 1232-33 (Idaho CV App. 
1985); Wichita Properties' v. Lanterman, 6 
Kan. App. 2d 656, _ , ' 6 3 3 P.2d 1154, J157-" 
58 (1981); Jefferson Dev. Co. v.r Heritage 
Cleaners, J09 Mich. App. 606,. 611, , 311 
N.W.2d 426, 428 (1981); Isbey v. Crews, 57 
N.C. App. 47, 51, 284 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1981); 
United States Natl Bank v. Homeland, Inc., 
291 Or. 374, 378-82, 631 P.2d 761,^763-65 " 
(1981). Cf. > Illinois Landlords9 Duty,( 34 
DePaul L. Rev. at 1044 n.77 (listing state 
statutes imposing mitigation duty«on landl-
ords). Only by following such a course can we 
ensure that serious efforts are made to rede-
ploy
 4 the • rental property ; in a productive 
fashion by those who are best able to accom-
plish that end and who are also best able to 
prove that required mitigation efforts have 
been carried out,* 
A further word about the standard by which 
a landlord's
 s efforts to mitigate are to r be 
measured: the standard is one of objective 
commercial i reasonableness. See i Olsen v. 
Country Club Sports, Inc., 110 Idaho at 794, 
718 P.2d at 1232. A landlord is obligated to 
take such steps as would be expected of a 
reasonable landlord letting out a similar pro-
perty in the same market conditions.,See Illi-
nois Landlords' Duty, 34 DePaul L. Rev. at 
1046-50. Obviously,, the objective commercial 
reasonableness of mitigation efforts is a fact 
question that depends heavily on the particu-
larities of the property and the relevant market 
at the pertinent point in time. See Jefferson 
Dev. Co., ,.109 Mich. .App. at 611-13^311 
N.W.2d at 428-29; United States Nat'l Bank, 
291 Or. at 379-84, 631 P.2d l att>764-67; 
Berkman, 55 Conn. B.J. at 351-53. 
Since we have imposed on the landlord an 
affirmative obligation to seek a new tenant, it 
is appropriate that costs reasonably incurred in 
readying the property and in reletting or att-
empting to relet be added to the amount rec-
overable from the breaching tenant. See, e.g., 
Richard v. Broussard, 495 So.* 2d 1291, 1293 
(La. 1986). Such costs may include,not only 
expenses incurred in seeking new tenants, but 
also costs of repairs or alterations of the pre-
mises reasonably necessary to successfully relet 
them. See Illinois Landlords' Duty, 34 DePaul 
L. Rev. at 1059. As in the present case, it is 
not uncommon, for property, particularly 
commercial property, to be modified to meet 
the n»^ eds of a new tenant. So long as the 
expenses incurred in the process of reletting, 
or attempting to relet the property are com-
mercially reasonable, they should be borne by 
the breaching tenant. See Illinois Landlords' 
Duty, 34 DePaul L. Rev. at 1058-61. * » , ^  
Finally,,our ruling that damage awards must 
take into account only, those rents that have 
actually accrued as of the time of trial dese-
rves explanation. If the trial is held after the 
lease term has expired, it is a relatively simple 
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matter to assess the landlord's * recoverable 
losses by taking into account the degree to 
which the landlord
 k has " fulfilled its duty' to 
mitigate. However,' when the term has not 
expired by the time of trial, it is impossible to 
evaluate the adequacy of the mitigation efforts 
the landlord will have to make in the future 
with respect to rents that have not yet come 
due, and it is equally impossible to determine 
whether those efforts will be successfulJ in 
reducing losses from future accruing rents. 
Some means must be devised to permit reco-
very of actual lossesJ occasioned by future 
accruing rents while ensuring that the landlord 
fulfills its duty to mitigate losses. 
Commentators have described three basic 
approaches to this problem of accounting for 
rental obligations accruing after the date of 
tr ia l . /They are the multiple-cause-of-
action rule, the anticipatory-breach doctrine, 
and the rctainedjurisdiction 'concept* We 
conclude that only one of these approaches, 
that of retained jurisdiction, adequately acc-
ommodates the values we judge to be impor-
tant in fashioning a remedy, 
<r
,The first of these approaches to the problem 
is labeled the multiple-cause-of-action 
approach. Under it, the landlord can recover 
only those rents that have accrued through the 
time of trial. Once a judgment is entered, the 
case is closed and the court's jurisdiction over 
the parties and * subject matter ' ends*' To 
recover additional rents that may accrue after 
trial, the landlord must initiate a new suit* See 
Kwall, 37 Case W. Res. L.1 Rev. at 274-
75. The justification offered for this approach 
is that it enables courts to avoid the awarding 
of uncertain or speculative future damages. See 
Frankel vc United States, 321 F. Supp. 
1331, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub. 
nom/, Frankel v. Heymf 466 F.2d 1226 (3d 
Cir/1972). It also ensures that the landlord's 
mitigation efforts are all in the past and can 
be fully evaluated.' 
We find this approach unsatisfactory since it 
requires a landlord to either forego expected 
periodic rental payments and bring suit for a 
lump sum at the end of the lease term or 
undertake the l expenses and difficulties of 
bringingl several separate claims over the 
length of the term. With either choice, the 
landlord risks having the tenant leave the 
court's geographical jurisdiction. 
K A number of courts have sought to avoid 
the problems of the multiple-cause-of-
action approach by following one of the two 
other approaches. The first is to apply to 
leases the contract doctrine of anticipatory 
breach. See generally Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §§250-57 (1981); A. Corbin, Corbin 
on Contracts, ] §959 " (1964). ' Under this 
approach, the landlord can bring suit prior to 
the expiration of the lease term and obtain a 
recovery that ' includes not only already 
accrued rents, but also an amount that repre-
ha Insurance Company * CODE*to 
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sents the present value of the amount by 
which the total of the future rents due under 
the lease exceeds the fair market rental value 
of the premises over the \same period. See 
I Speedee Mart, Inc. v. Stovall, 664 S.W.2d 
174, 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); Kwall, 37 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. at 279-91; 2 R. Powell, The 
Law of Real Property 1249[1], at 17-65 
(1988), This permits an immediate resolution 
of the damage issue without placing the lan-
dlord at risk of not being able to successfully 
prosecute further actions against the tenant for 
the future accruing rents. And it serves the 
'policies of the mitigation rule because, at least 
in theory, the incentive to mitigate is built into 
the measure of damages. By limiting the 
damages to the difference between the rents 
due and the fair market rental value of the 
premises, this approach attempts to take into 
account the amount the landlord will be able 
j to realize by reasonable efforts to relet. 
We conclude that the anticipatory-breach 
approach does not go far enough in avoiding 
the problem of Speculative damages. It requ-
ires a trial court to award what amounts to 
speculative damages because the damages are 
to be based on projections as to the future fair 
I market rental value of the premises throug-
( hout the term of the lease, which may be for 
years. Such projections also will inevitably be 
imperfect in accounting for the landlord's real 
success at reletting the premises.10 Thus, this 
approach sacrifices too much to uncertainty 
for both the landlord and the tenant in the 
interest of achieving a quick resolution. We 
conclude that such a trade-off is unnecessary 
in light of the availability of a better appr-
oach. 
The third approach, and the one we adopt, 
is that of retained jurisdiction. This approach, 
like the multiplecourse-of-action approach, 
allows the landlord to obtain a judgment soon 
after the tenant's breach; but rather than 
requiring the institution of an entirely new suit 
(or suits) to collect future rents, it permits the 
court to retain jurisdiction over the parties and 
the subject matter and enter new damage 
awards as additional rents accrue. See Kwall, 
37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 328-38. And, 
unlike the anticipatory-breach approach, this 
approach does not depend on speculative 
projections of future events that may lead to 
under- or overestimation of a landlord's 
losses. Damage awards will be based on past 
events only and will take into account the 
landlord's fnitigation efforts. This approach, 
therefore, should provide an incentive to the 
landlord to see that its mitigation duty is ful 
filled, lest it be denied some of the damages it 
would otherwise be entitled to. 
'The retained jurisdiction approach should 
be implemented as follows: When a landlord's 
action for breach of a lease is tried before the 
expiration of the lease term and the finder of 
fact \determines that the tenant has breached 
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the lease, the amount awarded should repre-
sent only those rents that have come due as of 
the time of trial. This judgment will be imm-
ediately enforceable. Rents accruing after the 
trial, on the other hand, may be recovered 
through what will amount to rather brief 
supplemental proceedings. To provide this 
remedy, the trial court should retain jurisdic-
tion of the underlying action.11 After, additi-
onal unpaid rents have accrued, the landlord 
may return to the court, without the risks and 
burdens that attend the filing of a new action, 
for a simple determination of additional losses 
suffered through the date of the supplemental 
proceedings and whether the landlord has 
fulfilled its ongoing duty to mitigate. Under 
the law-of-the-case doctrine, the initial 
determination of the tenant's liability would 
govern in any supplemental proceedings. See, 
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sand & Oil, Inc., 692 
P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); 46 Am. Jur. 2d 
Judgments §400 (1969). 
As Professor Kwall has' observed, the 
concept of retained jurisdiction has been used 
effectively in other areas of the law where a 
fair resolution of the matter requires that a 
mechanism be available for accommodating 
future developments. Examples- include divorce 
adjudications, probate matters, providing for 
specific enforcement of certain long-term 
contracts other - than realty / leases, and 
workers' compensation matters. Kwall, 37 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 291-328- It should 
be equally effective in the lease context and is 
well worth the minimal additional burden it 
may impose on the parties. See Kwall, 37 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. at 328-38. 
Applying the retained-jurisdiction appr-
oach to the present case requires a vacation of 
part of the judgment and a remand for further 
proceedings. The trial court found that the 
Reids had mitigated their damages through the 
time of trial. We have affirmed that finding 
and therefore affirm the judgment to the 
extent that it is based on rents that accrued 
through the date of trial. The second part of 
the court's order, however, apparently 
awarded the Reids damages for rents that 
accrued after the trial, without imposing on 
the Reids a continuing affirmative duty to 
mitigate these subsequently accruing losses. 
Therefore, that portion of the judgment must 
be reversed. However, since the trial court 
continues to have jurisdiction over the case 
insofar as it relates to rents accruing after 
trial, the Reids are free to return to the court 
and reduce to judgment additional damages 
they may have incurred as a result of rents 
accruing over the remainder ' of the' now-
expired term or additional costs they incurred 
as a result of their efforts to mitigate. Of 
course, the Reids must prove at such a proc-
eeding that they have fulfilled their,ongoing 
duty to mitigate.* ' i ** 4J; » ^ } < i " 
Finally, the Reids request an award of att-
orney fees incurred in connection with this 
appeal. Such an award appears to be within 
the contemplation of the lease agreement. We 
therefore remand the matter to the trial court 
for consideration of an award of such fees and 
costs. See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 
P.2d 499,503 (Utah 1988). 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham* Justice 
1. The judgment also included other minor amounts 
provided for under specific provisions of the agree-
ment. Those amounts are not in controversy on this 
appeal, and we do not address them. 
2. Some courts and commentators have taken the 
view that because a lease agreement is both a conv-
eyance of land apd a contract, the consequences of 
a surrender and acceptance must be viewed differe? 
ntly from either solely a contract law or a property 
law , perspective. For example, the Colorado 
Supreme Court recently expressed the view that 
while an acceptance of surrender does terminate all 
obligation for future rents as a matter of property 
law, it leaves intact the contractual obligation to pay 
such rents. Because the landlord and tenant remain 
in privity of contract, although not in privity of 
estate, the landlord accepting a surrender can still 
"maintain an action for contract damages caused by 
the tenant's breach of the lease." Schneiker v. 
Gordon,- 732 P.2d 603, 608 (Colo. 1987). Although 
the Colorado court did not expressly so state, we 
assume it would still allow for a complete termina-
tion of the lease relationship by means of a rescis-
sion. Our view is that the property and/or contract 
relationship between the parties can be effectively 
terminated by words or conduct that sufficiently 
demonstrates an intent to do so. 
3. As we explain in the latter part of this opinion, 
lessors in the Reids' position have what effectively 
amounts to an obligation to mitigate damages by 
seeking to relet the premises. That duty to mitigate, 
which reflects general principles of contract law, was 
not expressly considered in our older cases in which 
reletting was viewed as relevant, although not con-
clusive, evidence of the acceptance of surrender. 
Our ruling today requires a revaluation of those 
cases. Because we now hold that there is a duty to 
relet, it follows that it would be unfair and inappr-
opriate to treat such reletting alone as sufficient 
evidence to show that the landlord intended to 
accept a surrender of the premises and free the 
tenanti from all obligation for future rents. See 
Humbach, The CommonLaw Conception of 
Leasing: Mitigating Habttabihty, and Dependence of 
Covenants, 60 Wash. U.L.Q., 1213, 1240-56 (1983) 
[hereinafter Humbach, 60 Wash. U.L.Q.J. 
' We also note that the question of how an accep-
tance of surrender is manifested, as well as the 
related question of whether mitigation of damages is 
required of the landlord, has prompted numerous 
discussions of the dual doctrinal underpinnings of 
landlord-tenant law, which stem from ancient 
property a^w concepts gradually being modified by 
principles of contract law. See, e.g., Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 86, 87 (1972) (Douglas, J., diss-
enting in part) (ancient property notions replaced by 
more realistic predominantly contractual analysis of 
lease interests); Humbach, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1213; 
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Berkman, Duty of Commercial Landlords to Miti-
gate: Some Thoughts on Danpar Associates, 55 
Conn. B.J. 339 (1981); Kwall, Retained Jurisdiction 
in Damage Actions Based on Anticipatory Breach: 
A Missing Link in Landlord-Tenant jLa% 37 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 273 (1986). While we are cognizant 
of the deep doctrinal strains such commentators 
have noted in the law relating to leaseholds, we find 
it unnecessary to explore those doctrinal concerns in 
detail here. 
.'•• It suffices to say that modern landlord-tenant 
relationships, while steeped in the tradition of 
ancient property law, have taken on substantive 
.characteristics so similar to commercial transactions 
that certain of the legal principles developed in the 
law of contracts in the context of commercial tran-
sactions are now appropriately applied to leases, 
regardless of whether use is made of labels derived 
from the law of property conveyance or of contract. 
Our concern with substance rather than form is 
reflected in the law we apply in the present case with 
respect to the manner in which a lease may be ter-
minated and to the requirement that a nonbreaching 
party must act reasonably to mitigate damages. 
^Whether these rules are labeled as deriving from 
^property law or contract law is of little concern. 
4. The trial court actually referred to the date jud-
gment was entered rather than the date of trial. The 
rules of law we address here require that damages be 
determined by reference to the date of trial, so that 
proof of actual mitigation efforts and successes up 
to the time of trial can be considered in setting 
damage awards. Therefore, on remand the trial t 
{court should recalculate the damage award by refe-
rence to the trial date. The date on which judgment 
is entered is not relevant under the rules we now 
apply. 
5. The precise language of the awaid was as follows 
Plaintiffs are awarded judgment against 
Defendants for the remaining payments 
due under said lease in the amount of 
$1,100.00 for each month, due on the 
first of each month, beginning [with the 
trial date] and continuing until the exp-
iration of the Lease term on October 31, 
1985 minus any amounts, after subtra 
cting the costs and expenses of reletting, 
Plaintiffs may obtain through reletting 
the premises. 
6. It should be noted that, absent the language in 
paragraph 19, the result would likely be the same 
under the duty to mitigate we recognize today. 
7. Although the parties to this appeal did not bring 
It to this Court's attention, there is a section of the 
Utah Code that provides some legislative guidance 
as to how the question of a mitigation obligation 
might be answered in a different setting. Section 78-
36-12.6, which is part of the forcible entry and 
detainer chapter of the,Code, provides in relevant 
part: 
(1) In the event of abandonment the 
owner may retake the premises and 
attempt to rent them at a fair rental 
value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable: 
(a) for the entire rent due for the rem-
ainder of the term; or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period 
necessary to re-rent the premises at a 
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fair' rental value, plus the difference 
between the fair rental value and the 
rent agreed to in the prior rental agree-
ment, plus a reasonable commission for 
the renting of the premises and the 
costs, if any, necessary to restore the 
rental unit to its condition when rented 
by the tenant less normal wear and tear, 
This subsection applies, if less than 
Subsection (a) notwithstanding that the 
owner did not re-rent the premises 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-12.6 (1987) Sex gene-
rally Backman, Landlord-Tenant Law-A Per-
spective on Reform m Utah, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 727, 
738-39. 
We have never decided whether tins hnguage 
imposes an affirmative obligation to mitigate by 
reletting, as might well be argued Our decision in 
the present case is not controlled by section 78-36-
12.6 because we have previously construed it to 
apply only when the tenant has "abandoned" the 
premises without giving notice. See Fashion Place 
Assocs. v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah 
1988); Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-l2.3(3),-12.6 
(1987). Here, Mutual gave notice to the Reids when 
it vacated and thus did not "abandon" the premises 
within the meaning of the statute. 
8. The concept of mitigation of damages is grou-
nded in traditional contract law principles and is 
also known as the doctrine of "avoidable consequ-
ences." Under this doctrine, a party injured by a 
contract breach may not recover damages that he or 
she, with reasonable effort, could have avoided. See 
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 
(Utah 1983); Restatement (Second) of Contract 
§350 (1981); 5A Corbin,* Corbm on Contracts, 
§1039(1964). 
9. The commentators also note a variant of this 
approach, which may be termed a single-recovery 
rule, under which the landlord is limited to a single 
remedy for all obligations under the lease agree-
ment. The landlord must elect between waiting to 
bring suit after the term has ended or bringing suit 
earlier and effectively forfeiting later accruing rents 
See Kwall, Retained Jurisdiction m Damage Actions 
Based on Anticipatory Breach: A Missing Link m 
Landlord-Tenant Law, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev 
273, 330 (1986); Humbach, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. at 
1251. We reject this variant for much the same 
reasons we find the multiple-cause-of-action 
approach to be Unsatisfactory. 
10. Some courts following the anticipatory-breach 
approach have dealt with the concern over awarding 
speculative damages by arbitrarily limiting the lan-
dlord's recovery to rents accruing in a period 
shorter than the lease term, a period for which 
damages can be projected with some certainty. See 
Kwall, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 285-89; 2 
Powell, The Law of Real Property 1249(1 J, at 17 
65. We find this stunted recovery rule also to b 
unsatisfactory. 
11. Because the entire, claim of the landlord against 
the tenant as it had accrued through the time of trial 
would be adjudicated in the initial judgment n 
would be final for purposes of appeal. 
H O W E , Associate Chief Just ice: (Concurring 
and Dissenting) 
I concur in all of the majority opinion 
except in that part which holds that the trial 
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court's determination that there had not been 
a constructive eviction of Mutual is supported 
by the evidence. In my opinion, the uncontr-
overted evidence of the noise created by Inte-
rmountain and its affect on Mutual demonst-
rate that a constructive eviction did occur., 
Testimony from both Mutual and Intermou-
ntain personnel is in substantial agreement as 
to the frequency and intensity of the noise. It 
clearly met the standard % for a constructive 
eviction established by our case law, i.e., that 
the landlord's actions or failure to act, depr-
ives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of 
the demised premises or materially impairs 
such enjoyment. Barker v. Utah Oil Refining 
Co., I l l Utah 308, 178 P.2d 386 (1947). The 
trial court's refusal to so find is "clearly err-
oneous" even when'due deference is given to 
that court's opportunity to judge the credibi-
lity of the witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
The trial court's determination that there was 
not a constructive eviction is a conclusion of 
law which is not entitled to any deference by 
us. Zions First National Bank v. National 
American Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1988). The trial court also»erred in 
employing an erroneous standard when it 
relied on the fact that the noise and other 
cumulative acts of plaintiffs did not cause any 
loss of business. 
Mutual leased about 60 percent of the main 
floor of plaintiffs' building. Two weeks later, 
plaintiffs leased the balance'of the space on 
that floor to Intermountain. Both tenants had 
to use a common entry and hallway, and 
employees and clients of Mutual had to pass 
by the entrance of Intermountain to reach the 
entrance of Mutual's space. Mutual conducted 
an insurance business which included rende-
ring service to policyholders and selling insu-, 
ranee to prospective buyers. In contrast, Int-
ermountain used its space mainly to instruct 
and motivate salespersons and sales trainees to 
sell housewares door to door. Testimony was 
adduced from agents and employees of Mutual 
and from principals and agents of Intermou-
ntain that three days each week, up to 45 
salespersons and trainees were crowded into a 
room adjoining Mutual's space for training 
sessions at Intermountain's offices in the 
building. 
During the course of the training sessions, 
Mutual's beneficial enjoyment of its leased 
premises was materially impaired by the foil-* 
owing acts of Intermountain: Instructors of 
Intermountain would conduct a motivational 
exercise known as a "fire-up" drill in which 
the participants would, in unison, clapping 
and shouting out loud, count backward from 
number ten down to one, followed by a* shout, 
"I feel great!" This was followed by loud 
clapping, cheering, and the stamping of feet. 
On one occasion, the instructor threw a pie in 
the face of someone to get the participants' 
attention and interest. Applause ^  and loud 
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laughter occurred at other times in response to 
stimuli from the instructor. Loud stereo rock 
music* was played to create an atmosphere 
compatible with the young trainees. Intermo-
untain freely used the hall leading to Mutual's 
rented space fof the purpose of serving refre-
shments to participants during break times. 
Also,. registration tables were set up in the 
hallway, and trainees were permitted to engage 
in practice sessions with one another in the 
hall. The large number of participants at times 
overloaded available restrooms and, on some 
occasions, used all the paper towels and litt-
ered the floor: Intermountain placed in the 
hall boxes of merchandise which were,to be 
sold or delivered to salespersons or customers. 
One witness described the hallway as looking 
like a warehouse. The' participants' at times 
filled up the building's parking lot, as well as 
all available nearby street parking. 
' All of this conduct by Intermountain was 
highly disruptive' to Mutual and worked to 
deprive it of the quiet enjoyment of its leased 
premises to which it was entitled. As emplo-
yees and clients of Mutual would attempt to 
make their way through the hall during trai-
ning sessions,
 T they *- would on occasion be 
stopped or directed by Intermountain perso-
nnel into the sales and training sessions. When 
loud noise would emanate / from Intermoun-
tain's premises, Mutual would have to termi-
nate its activities until the disturbance ceased. 
Mutual's employees i and agents had to either 
stop or delay their telephone conversations 
and sales presentations they were making to 
prospective buyers and apologize for the dis-
ruption. Employees and clients of»Mutual 
experienced difficulty in finding parking places 
when the training sessions were being condu-
cted. The overuse of the restrooms by Inter-
mountain deprived Mutual of a clean and well-
supplied facility. 
During the sixteen months that, Mutual * 
occupied plaintiffs' building, it made nume-
rous complaints to them about Intermoun-
tain's conduct. Beginning on June 10, 1981, 
Mutual sent a series /of letters to plaintiffs 
complaining primarily / of the noise. Other 
letters were se/it on August 5, October 12, 
November 17,,and December 15. In the last 
letter, Mutual requested that plaintiffs take 
appropriate action to correct the noise situa-
tion immediately and gave notice that should 
disturbances continue after five days, Mutual 
would consider the lease to be breached and 
would vacate the premises* Plaintiffs early on 
took the position that
 l there was nothing 
improper about Intermountain's conduct and 
operation, but they did meet with the princi-
pals - of Intermountain • on several, occasions 
and finally had their attorney write Intermo-
untain, requesting that it cease and desist from 
further noise. Intermountain temporarily did 
desist from creating loud noise and agreed that 
it would not conduct "fire-up" drills with * 
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• their salespeople before 5:30 p.m., by which> 
time most of Mutual's employees had left the 
.building.i However, two principals of Interm-i 
ountain and two of its salespersons testified 
that in January 1982, they broke*that agree-{ 
ment. One of the principals admitted that he 
conducted several, fire-up drills in January! 
prior to 5:30 p.m. just to "ruffle the feathers" 
of Mutual's manager.' Finally» on February * 
'12, 1982, Mutual paid its / rent current and 
t moved from the .building, giving notice to 
plaintiffs that its request as contained in its 
letter of December 15 had not been met. 
."•'The trial court made no findings as to the 
quantum or frequency of the noise* but con-' 
eluded simply that "although the court finds 
the ^noise made by Intermountain Marketing 
was distracting to defendants, it was not of 
sufficient magnitude to warrant abandonment 
of the leased premises." With that conclusion I 
cannot agree.' It is not clear just how much 
noise the trial court I thought a tenant mustj 
Ltolerate before there is a breach of the cove-
nant of the lease that the tenant may have 
quiet possession and enjoyment, such as was 
contained in the lease here. Our case law is 
clear that constructive eviction occurs when 
the tenant is deprived of the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the demised premises or»his enjoy-
ment is materially impaired. Barker v. Utah 
Oil Refining Co.% 111 Utah at 312, 178 P.2d 
at 388. One cannot read the record in this case. 
;without being impressed that Mutual was long-
suffering and endured unnecessary outbursts 
of noise from its adjoining tenant at least 
from June 1981 to>February 1982. The testi-' 
mony at trial from six agents and secretaries 
rof Mutual and from four principals and sale-
smen from Intermountain was that the loud 
outbursts of noise continued unabated right up 
to the time Mutual vacated. * Mutual took 
recordings of some of the outbursts of noise' 
and documented them as to dates and times. > 
•^One,of the plaintiffs, Mrs/Reid, had an 
office on the second floor above Intermoun-
tain and testified that while she could hear the 
outbursts of noise, the sounds were muffled. 
This was the entire extent of plaintiffs' rebu-
ttal ' to Mutual's and Inter mountain's testi-
mony respecting the intensity of the noise. 
'Undoubtedly the noise was muffled when it 
reached Mrs/Reid because there was a solid 
cement floor separating the second floor from 
the main floor. While plaintiffs disputed that 
parking was a problem, they did not contra-
dict the testimony of several Mutual agents 
that the frequent outbursts of'noise were so 
upsetting that they did not attempt to conduct 
any sales work' on the premises," but were 
forced , to ' visit prospective buyers in their 
homes. Mutual's space and Intermountain's 
space were separated only by a thin portable 
wall installed over the carpet. One of the pri-
ncipals ' of- Intermountain testified that its 
business and Mutual's business "clashed." He 
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stated that Mutual was endeavoring to conduct 
a professional business on a different level 
from that of Intermountain. Mutual did not 
make a hasty decision to vacate but exhausted 
all of its resources and patience to solve the 
disruption. But despite its pleas and plaintiffs1 
attempts, the operation of
 vthe two side-by 
side businesses was simply not compatible 
The trial judge erred in requiring Mutual to 
tolerate and suffer more noise than it had 
•already endured. 
t~ The trial court also based its decision in part 
on the faulty premise that Mutual had not 
, shown that it had lost any business. Our cases 
do not require that such a showing be made to 
constitute a constructive eviction. Barker v 
Utah Oil Refining Co., I l l Utah at 312, 178 
P.2d at 388, held that there is a constructive 
eviction when the landlord, without intent to 
oust the tenant, "does some act which deprives 
the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the 
demised premises or materially impairs such 
enjoyment." That is all that is required, and 
the fact that Mutual did not attempt to prove 
any loss of business is immaterial. 
I would reverse the judgment entered below 
and remand the case to the trial court with 
instructions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of Associate 
Chief Justice Howe. 
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Rule 4 RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, a judgment, or an order but before the entry of the judgment or order 
of the district court, juvenile court, or circuit court shall be treated as filed 
after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The court from which the appeal is 
taken, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after 
the expiration of the time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion to 
extend time that is filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be heard 
ex parte unless the court from which the appeal is taken requires otherwise. 
Notice of any such motion that is filed after the expiration of the prescribed 
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice 
of the court from which the appeal is taken. No extension shall exceed 30 days 
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order grant-
ing the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Filing with county clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motion. 
Premature notice. 
Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness. 
—Date of notice. 
Cited. 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile 
court, and the original was returned to appel-
lant's counsel. State In re M.S., 102 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 63 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Final order or judgment. 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. In re T.D.C., 748 
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Post-judgment motion. 
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type 
listed in Subdivision (b) suspends the finality 
of the judgment, and a notice of appeal filed 
prior to disposition of such a motion by entry of 
a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdic-
tion on an appellate court. Anderson v. 
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Premature notice. 
A notice of appeal filed after a ruling on a 
motion to alter or amend a judgment has been 
announced, but before the entry of an order 
disposing of the motion, is premature and does 
not confer jurisdiction on the court. Anderson 
v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Reconsideration of order. 
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider 
and overrule its prior denial of the state's re-
quest to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State 
ex rel. C.Y. v. Ya+es, 96 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Timeliness. 
Case was temporarily remanded to the juve-
nile court in order to allow that court to make 
a determination whether an order extending 
the time for appeal should be entered by the 
juvenile court under Subdivision (e) of this 
rule, when it was not apparent whether the 
notice of appeal was either timely filed or 
deemed timely filed by the juvenile court. State 
In re M.S., 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
—Date of notice. 
In determining whether a notice of appeal is 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
appellate court, the appellate court is bound by 
the filing date on the notice of appeal transmit-
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granting or denying any other such motion* A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The district court, upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by Paragraph (a) of this rule. Any such motion which is filed 
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district 
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after expira-
tion of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance 
with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
motion, whichever occurs later. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
(a). Coupled with Rule 3, this paragraph re-
quires that a notice of appeal be filed with the 
clerk of the district court within 30 days after 
the date of entry of judgment or order from 
which the appeal is taken. There are two sig-
nificant changes in appellate procedure from 
prior practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP: (1) the 
time frame within which the appeal must be 
taken is 30 days rather than one month; and 
(2) the 30-day period commences to run after 
the date of the "entry of the judgment or order" 
rather than "from the date of the entry of the 
judgment or order in the Register of Actions." 
The one month time frame under prior Rule 
73(a) was determined to be both inconsistent 
and confusing, at least measured against a 
more definite 30-day time limit. Computation 
of time is defined under Rule 22(a). It is in-
tended that the 30-day time limit within which 
to appeal from a final judgment or order of the 
district court or a juvenile court shall be appli-
cable in all cases, notwithstanding a statute or 
other rule to the contrary (see § 78-2-4 Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended), with the excep-
tion that in statutory forcible entry and unlaw-
ful detainer actions, an appeal shall be taken 
within ten days from the entry of the final 
judgment or order appealed from. The 30-day 
time limit will qualify the "one month" appeal 
period set out in § 78-3a-51 Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended, for a direct appeal from a 
juvenile court. 
Because of the conversion to microfilm filing 
process by the clerks of the various district 
courts, the Register of Actions Book is no lon-
ger maintained in some counties as contem-
plated in prior Rules 73(a) and 79(a) URCivP. 
The date of "entry of the judgment or order" 
from which the appeal is taken is considered to 
be the day on which the judgment or order is 
"filed" with the district court clerk. See Rule 
58A(c) URCivP. It is the committee's judgment 
that when the clerk receives and stamps-in the 
judgment or order, the document is "filed" un-
der Rule 58A and under this Rule 4. 
This paragraph requires that a notice of ap-
peal from a final judgment or order in a crimi-
nal case be filed within 30 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from, State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 
1981), except that in a capital case where the 
death sentence has been imposed, the case is 
automatically appealed to and reviewed by the 
court. Rule 26(h) URCrimP. It is the commit-
tee's view that even in capital cases involving 
the death sentence, a notice of appeal should be 
filed under this paragraph so that the appel-
late process incident to preparation and trans-
mittal of the record may commence in a timely 
manner. 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph retains the 
concept under prior Rule 73(a) URCivP that a 
timely filed motion under Rule 50(b), 52(b) or 
Rule 59 shall toll the date from which the time 
for appeal commences to run In the event of 
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such a motion, the time for appeal under para-
graph (a) commences from the date of entry of 
the order denying a new trial or granting or 
denying any other motion. The paragraph 
adopts the provision of Rule 4(a)(4) FRAP that 
a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
a motion under Rule 50(b), 52(b), or 59 has no 
effect and must be filed within the prescribed 
time after the entry of the order by the district 
court disposing of the motion. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no coun-
terpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in substan-
tial part, an adoption of Rule 4(a)(2) FRAP. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the 
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals 
(see prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires 
that a notice of the cross-appeal be filed within 
14 days after the date of the first notice of ap-
peal. The paragraph adopts substantially the 
time period and concept of cross-appeal in Rule 
4(a)(3) FRAP. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph retains the 
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Attorney fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Entry of judgment. 
Unless Rule 2.9(b) of the District and Circuit 
Court Rules of Practice has been complied 
with, the judgment is not deemed "filed" 
within the meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the time for tak-
ing an appeal from that judgment under this 
rule does not begin to run because the judg-
ment has not been properly "entered." Calfo v. 
D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986). 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Neither U.R.C.P. 6(b), granting the court 
power to extend a time limit where a failure to 
act in time is due to excusable neglect gener-
ally, nor U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), authorizing the 
court to relieve from final judgment for inad-
vertence or excusable neglect, applies where a 
notice of appeal has not been timely filed. 
Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 
843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing 
prior practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that 
the time for filing a notice of appeal may be 
extended by the district court, upon a showing 
of excusable neglect or good cause, if a motion 
for extension is filed not later than 30 days 
after the expiration of the time prescribed in 
paragraphs (a) or (b). The application shall be 
on motion and may be ex parte (although ex 
parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior 
to the expiration of the time for appeal. The 
district court may not grant an extension ex-
ceeding 30 days past the original time for ap-
peal or ten days from the date of entry of the 
order granting the motion, whichever occurs 
later. Excusable neglect or good cause under 
this paragraph refers generally to an extraor-
dinary circumstance that prevented the mov-
ant from filing a timely notice of appeal and 
not to inadvertence or oversight on the part of 
counsel or to the failure of the client to autho-
rize an appeal. 
an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Recon-
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo-
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law-
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situa-
tions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of a notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Final judgment. 
Where the trial court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either is premature because the judg-
ments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion was timely 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure to upset the judgment, and notices of 
appeal from the judgment were filed after the 
motion was made, but before the disposition of 
the motion, the motion rendered the notices of 
appeal ineffective, and notice of appeal had to 
be filed within the required time from the date 
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B. PARTY ENTIH si :- KAISE QUESTIONS 
1. . . . GLNI.iiAL 
§ 706. Generally.11 
Aside from the question as to what parties arc entitled to appeal at all,18 
questions may be presented as to whether a party, rightfully in the appellate 
court, is entitled to have particular claims of error reviewed.13 Ordinarily ap-
pellate review of error in the court below may be had only at the instance and 
for the benefit of a party to the proceeding below in which the error arose14 
An appellant cannot successfully complain on appeal on alleged error which 
affects only another party who did not appeal or complain.15 
§ 707", Rule that party not appealing is not entitled to assert error. 
While an appellee who has not cross appealed may argue in the appellate 
court in support of the decision appealed from,18 and in opposition to a claim 
of error in the court below raised by the appellant,17 it is settled that ordinar-
the ground of reversal, the higher appellate 
court was compelled to presume that the re-
versal was not on a question of fact, although 
the opinion of the intermediate appellate 
court intimated its intention to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court on the facts as well 
as on the law. Spcnce v Ham, 163 NY 220, 
57 NE 412. 
11. Adverse interest as condition of right to 
appeal, see §§ 178-185, supra; harmless or 
prejudicial error generally, see §§ 776 et seq., 
infra. 
12. See §§ 172 et scq., supra, 
13. The two questions are not easily dis 
tinguishable and in some cases it is not pos-
sible to determine from the report whether 
the court was considering the right to appeal 
or merely the right to have a particular issue 
reviewed. 
14. United States v Patterson, 15 How (US) 
10, 14 L ed 578. 
Where the appellant was not a pari;) to a 
petition to reopen the case for the taking of 
further testimony, he cannot successfully com-
plain of the trial court's denial of that peti-
tion/ Re Wohlcber. 320 Pa 83, 181 A 479, 
101 ALR 829. 
Rule that only parties or their privies may 
appeal, see §§ 173-176, supra. 
15. Baum v Lynn. 72 Miss 932, 18 So 428; 
Eastern Outfitting Co. v Manheim, 59 Wash 
428, 110 P 2 3 . 
Where the alleged liability on appellant's 
part is independent of the alleged liability of 
a codefendant, he cannot assign on appeal as 
error in the court below that judgment was 
rendered against him while the codefendant 
was exonerated. Rawlings v Inglcbritzen, 211 
Miss 760, 52 So 2d 630. 
A defendant who did not cross-examine a 
witness cannot raise on appeal the question 
whether cross-examination by another defend-
ant was unduly restricted. Bingham v 
National Bank, Ml1", Monl I ">9, 72 P2d 90, 113 
ALR 315. 
Where a motion to punish a corporation 
and its president for contempt of an injunc-
tion order alleges specific acts of violation 
upon the part of the president, he will not 
be heard to complain of the insufficiency of 
its allegations as against the corporation. Ex 
parte Genecov, 143 Tex 476, 186 SW2d 225, 
160 ALR 1099, cert den 326 US 733, 90 
L ed 436, 66 S Ct 41, reh den 326 US 808, 
90 L ed 493, 66 S Ct 137. 
Limitation of review to matters raised on. 
appeal, see § 723, infra. 
16. Philadelphia Casualty Co. v Fcchheimer 
(CA6OI110) 220 F 401. 
Without having filed a cross appeal, an 
appellee may urge in support of the decision 
appealed from any matter appearing in the 
record even where his arguments involve an 
attack on the reasoning of the court below 
or an insistence on matter overlooked or 
ignored by it. TarTke v Dunham, 352 US 
280, 1 L e d 2d 314, 77 S Ct 307. 
But see also State v Fairmont Creamery 
Co. 153 Iowa 702, 133 NW 895, holding 
that where only the state appealed from the 
dismissal of an indictment, and the only 
question presented for appellate review by the 
state was the constitutionality of the statute 
involved, the defendant, as appellee, could 
not successfully urge the appellate court to 
consider the question of the sufficiency of the 
indictment, and to affirm the decision appealed 
from because of insufficiency of the indict-
ment. 
17. Alexander v Cosdcn Pipe Line Co. 290 
US 484, 78 L ed 452, 54 S Ct 292; Robbins 
v Beatty, 246 Iowa 80, 67 NW2d 12; Abbott 
v Thome, 34 Wash 692, 76 P 302; Fleming 
v Northern Tissue Paper Mill, 135 Wis 157, 
114 NW 841. 
The appellee may, for ii istance, urge that 
the decision appealed from, though based on 
an erroneous reason, should nevertheless be 
1 5 2 
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ily an appellee who did not file a cross appeal is not entitled to an appellate 
review to obtain a decision more favorable to him than that appealed from by 
the other party.1* For instance, an appellee who has not cross appealed may 
not seek in the appellate court a determination of the amount imolvcd more 
favorable to him than that made by the court below.19 Errors prejudi* ially 
affecting an appellee who made no cross appeal are not within the scope of 
appellate review, despite his objections, in the court below, to those errors.20 
The claim of one who took no appeal from a decision adverse to him is not 
before the appellate court upon appeal by another party not in privity with 
him, even where the other party has a practical interest in sustaining the claim 
of the nonappealing party.1 Unless the decision below is reversed in favor of 
the appellant, it must on appeal stand even though it is not as favorable to 
upheld on another and sound reason. JafTke v 
Dunham. 352 US 280, 1 L ed 2d 314, 77 
S Ct 307. 
One whose right to claim a fund under a 
will has been denied by the court below, 
which, however, awarded him the fund under 
a claim of equitable recoupment, is not, where 
the other party has appealed, prevented, by 
his failure to take a cross appeal, from as-
serting in the appellate court, in support 
of the decree of the court below, that it 
misconstrued the will. Cleveland Clinic 
Foundation v Humphrys (CA6 Ohio) 97 F 
2d 849, 121 ALR 163, cert den 305 US 628, 
83 L ed 403, 59 S Ct 93. 
A party granted a new trial by the trial. 
court has no occasion to appeal, but he should 
not be precluded from showing by the record 
brought up by his adversary any and all 
errors committed in the trial of the cause; 
and all questions presented by the record and 
necessary for the proper disposition of the 
case will be passed upon. Smart v Kansas 
City, 208 Mo 162, 105 SW 709. 
18. Helvering v PfcifTer, 302 US 247, 82 
L ed 231, 58 S Ct 159; Wendc v Chicago City 
R. Co. 271 111 437, 111 NE 275; Robbins v 
Beatty, 246 Iowa 80, 67 NW2d 12; Holland v 
Shaffer, 162 Kan 474, 178 P2d 235, 173 ALR 
845; Kelley v Burnam, 305 Ky 544. 204 SW 
2d 965, 174 ALR 531; Mugford v Baltimore, 
185 Md 266, 44 A2d 745, 162 ALR 1101; 
Magill v Magill, 317 Mass 89, 56 NE2d 892, 
154 ALR 1406; Ogcns v Northern Industrial 
Chemical Co. 304 Mass 401, 24 NE2d 1, 126 
ALR 280; Caldwell v Travelers' Ins. Co. 305 
Mo 619, 267 SW 907, 39 ALR 56; Timber 
Structures, Inc. v C. W. S. Grinding & Ma-
chine Works, 191 Or 231, 229 P2d 623, 25 
ALR2d 1358; Kerens Nat. Bank v Stockton, 
120 Tex 546, 40 SW2d 7, 77 ALR 362; 
Merager v Turnbull, 2 Wash 2d 711, 99 P2d 
434, 127 ALR 1142. 
Annotation: 1 L ed 2d 1820 (United States 
Supreme Court cases). 
A respondent or an appellee may urge any 
matter appearing in the record in support 
of a judgment, but he may not attack it 
even on grounds asserted in the court below, 
in an effort to have the appellate court re-
verse it, when he himself has not sought re-
view of the whole judgment, or of that portion 
which is adverse to him. Letulle v Scoficld, 
308 US 415, 84 L ed 355, 60 S Ct 311, reh 
den 309 US 694, 84 L ed 1035, 60 S Ct 465. 
An appellee who has not taken a cross 
appeal is not entitled, in equity proceedings, 
to have the decree revised in his favor, on 
the ground that it is against the weight of the 
evidence. Morley Constr. Co. v Maryland 
Casualty Co. 300 US 185, 81 L ed 593, 57 
S Ct 325, reh den 300 US 687, 81 L ed 
888, 57 S Ct 505. 
The question of the expiration of the lim-
itation period cannot be considered on appeal 
by the plaintiff from a nonsuit where the 
defendant did not appeal. Pearson v Tuohy 
Bros. Co. 113 Or 230, 231 P 129, 36 ALR 
1113. 
Ordinarily, in the absence of a cross ap-
peal, the decision appealed from fixes the 
law of the case insofar as the appellee is 
concerned Bennett v State Corporation Com. 
157 Kan 539, 142 P2d 810, 150 ALR 1140; 
Ecklcy v Bonded Adjustment Co. 30 Wash 
2d 96, 190 P2d 718, 1 ALR2d 717. 
19. Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v Cul-
hanc, 299 US 51, 81 L ed 33. 57 S Ct 81; 
Stott v Johnston, 36 Cal 2d 861, 229 P2d 348, 
28 ALR2d 580; Merchants Discount Corp v 
Federal Street Corp. 300 Mass 167, 14 NE2d 
155. 118 ALR 412; Timber Structures, Inc. 
v C. W. S Grinding & Machine Works, 191 
Or 231, 229 P2d 623, 25 ALR2d 1358. 
20. Salter v Ulrich, 22 Cal 2d 26'*, 138 
P2d 7, 146 ALR 1344; Beach v Cooke, 28 
NY 508. 
On appeal by the defendant from an order 
overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff's amend-
ed petition, the plaintiff, if he fails to cross 
appeal as he might have done under the 
provisions of the applicable statute, cannot be 
heard to complain of an adxerse ruling of 
the trial court in refusing to consider allega-
tions added by the amendment. S< hxiltc v 
Westborough. Inc. 163 Kan 111, 180 P2d 278, 
172 ALR 259. 
1. Caskins v Caskins, 311 Ky 59, 221 SW 
2d 374, 13 ALR2d 970. 
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